Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation by Gaessler, Fabian et al.
Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate:
Re-evaluating the Eﬀect of Patents on
Cumulative Innovation
Fabian Gaessler (MPI-IC Munich)
Dietmar Harhoﬀ (MPI-IC Munich)
Stefan Sorg (MPI-IC Munich)
Discussion Paper No. 220
December 16, 2019
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 | www.rationality-and-competition.de
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spokesperson: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
+49 (89) 2180 3405 | info@rationality-and-competition.de
Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate:
Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation
Fabian Gaessler a∗ Dietmar Harhoff abc Stefan Sorg ad
a Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich
b Munich School of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University (LMU), Munich
c Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London
d Munich Graduate School of Economics, Ludwig-Maximilians-University (LMU), Munich
August 2019
ABSTRACT
We investigate the causal effect of patent rights on cumulative innovation, using large-scale data that approximate
the patent universe in its technological and economic variety. We introduce a novel instrumental variable for
patent invalidation that exploits personnel scarcity in post-grant opposition at the European Patent Office. We
find that patent invalidation leads to a highly significant and sizeable increase of follow-on inventions. The effect
is driven by cases where the removal of the individual exclusion right creates substantial freedom to operate for
third parties. Importantly, our results suggest that bargaining failure between original and follow-on innovators
is not limited to environments commonly associated with high transaction costs. (107 words)
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1 Introduction
Inventions are rarely stand-alone achievements, but build to a large extent on previous discoveries
– cumulative innovation has become a dominant characteristic of the modern industrial innova-
tion apparatus. Technical progress may however be impeded if the cumulative nature of invention
negatively interacts with patent rights.1 While the invention’s disclosure and the resulting knowl-
edge spillovers are seen as facilitating cumulative innovation (Scotchmer and Green, 1990), exclu-
sion rights on existing technologies require coordination between original and follow-on inventors
(Scotchmer, 1991). In the absence of transaction costs, the involved parties should reach a licensing
agreement such that cumulative innovation is not blocked. In the presence of transaction costs, how-
ever, such negotiations may fail or result in inefficient licensing outcomes that thwart subsequent
inventive efforts. In this case, we would expect detrimental consequences for technical progress
and, ultimately, for economic growth. This paper investigates the causal effect of patent rights on
follow-on invention.2 We employ a new instrumental variable and make use of a large-scale dataset
which approximates the patent universe in its technological and economic variety, e.g., concerning
patent value and competitive landscape. We find strong evidence supporting the notion that cumu-
lative innovation is impeded by patents. Reconciling our results with those of previous studies, we
suggest that patents likely block follow-on invention across all technology fields – the blocking effect
is just easier to detect in some cases than in others.
The empirical investigation of whether and where patents block cumulative innovation calls for
exogenous variation in patent protection (Furman et al., 2017), e.g., in the rejection of pending
patents during examination or the invalidation of granted patents during litigation. For interpreta-
tion, scholars have implicitly relied on the assumption that patent-induced bargaining failure will be
reflected in increases of follow-on invention by others when the upstream patent right is removed.
We argue, however, that the absence of an exclusion right can only give rise to an increase in follow-
on invention by others if two conditions are met: first, bargaining failure must have previously
limited efficient licensing, e.g., due to high transaction costs; and second, the removal of the patent
must create freedom to operate, i.e., the ability to efficiently commercialize a new invention in the
technology or product market.3 Hence, the absence of follow-on invention after the removal of a
patent does not necessarily imply the absence of ex-ante bargaining failure. Quite to the contrary,
freedom to operate may still be restricted after a particular patent right has been removed.
Concerning bargaining failure (BF), prior literature suggests that transaction costs will be par-
ticularly high where negotiations involve numerous patents and rights holders (Bessen and Maskin,
2009; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Shapiro, 2001). BF is thus expected
to be most prevalent where products comprise a multitude of patentable elements, i.e., in so-called
complex technology areas (Cohen et al., 2000), and where strategic firm behavior promotes patent
thickets and fences (Granstrand, 1999; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Harhoff et al., 2007; Ziedonis,
2004). Whether bargaining failure exists in discrete technology areas, where products are com-
1See Hall and Harhoff (2012) for a literature survey.
2We treat “cumulative innovation” and “follow-on invention” as synonyms in spite of subtle differences in meaning.
3See WIPO (2005) and Pardey et al. (2003) for similar definitions.
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prised of one or few patentable elements, is largely an open question – one which we will address
in this paper. The prevalence of BF may also differ depending on the size of the original and follow-
on innovators. While holders of large patent portfolios may be able to reach cross-licensing deals
for follow-on invention, small firms or entrants may lack the leverage to negotiate efficient licenses
(Cockburn et al., 2010; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Generally, the relative burden of trans-
action costs is disproportionately large for small firms.
Concerning freedom to operate (FTO), a very different scenario prevails. When bundles of
patents jointly protect (and block) a technology, the potential gain in FTO from removing one in-
dividual patent can be very limited. In contrast, for discrete and non-overlapping technologies,
substantial gains in FTO may be attained when the individual patent right is revoked. The ability
to obtain FTO also depends on the characteristics of the original and the follow-on innovator, e.g.,
concerning complementary assets to restrict market entry or to retain market power even in the
absence of an exclusion right.4 Unless the complementary assets to successfully commercialize the
technology are available, the removal of the focal patent right will hardly attract investments into
follow-on inventions.
This has immediate implications for the interpretation of the effect of patent removal. The
marginal effect of patent invalidation (or patent rejection) is a direct function of FTO. But the cu-
mulative innovation literature is interested in measuring the effect of having patent protection (not
individual patent rights) removed. That would require removing all patent rights that limit post-
removal FTO for a particular technology. This effect is not measurable, since we have no empirical
setting with this kind of experiment.
We thus postulate that the marginal blocking effect of an individual patent will equal the cumu-
lative innovation effect (and thus reflect the underlying bargaining failure) only when FTO is solely
limited by the patent in question, e.g., for discrete technology areas and for small patent holders.
In contrast, whenever FTO remains restricted after the removal of one patent right, as in patent
thickets or fences, the marginal blocking effect can only be interpreted as a lower bound to the full
blocking effect of patent protection on cumulative innovation.
To address the above challenges and to estimate the causal effect of existing patent rights on
follow-on invention, we construct a new dataset of more than 33,000 post-grant oppositions at
the European Patent Office (EPO) across all technology areas. The EPO provides a harmonized
application procedure for patent protection and grants European patents for as many as 38 countries,
with a population of more than 450 million and a total GDP of more than 20 trillion USD. In the
first nine months after grant, third parties can challenge the validity of a European patent by filing
an opposition against the EPO’s granting decision.5 The opposition procedure represents a low-cost
opportunity to centrally invalidate a European patent before it is split into a bundle of national
patent rights. Opposition is therefore a frequent event with a historical opposition rate of about 6%,
which well exceeds litigation rates in Europe (Cremers et al., 2017) and the US (Bessen and Meurer,
4Such complementary assets could lie in competitive manufacturing, distribution channels, know-how, and marketing
(Teece, 1986). Such characteristics are likely correlated with firm size.
5The opposition procedure at the EPO can be compared to the Post Grant Review (PGR) at the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). PGR represents an option to challenge validity administratively at the USPTO during the first 9 months
after grant without involvement of the judiciary.
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2013; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Opposition is also less prone to settlements due to the
short time horizon available for negotiations and due to the EPO’s ability to pursue an invalidation
even after the opponent’s withdrawal. Fewer than 10% of all oppositions end without adjudication,
while more than 90% of litigation cases in the US end in settlements (Harhoff and Graham, 2014).
To overcome endogeneity issues concerning the outcome of opposition, we introduce a new
instrumental variable. We exploit exogenous variation in the participation of the patent’s granting
examiner in the opposition division, which decides on the grounds for opposition against the patent’s
validity. Although the rules and regulations of the EPO allow some personnel overlap in the exami-
nation and opposition procedure, they do not require the involvement of the examiner. In fact, the
examiner participates in about 68% of all opposition proceedings covered by our dataset, with vari-
ation over time and technology field. This variation is primarily a function of the non-availability of
other examiners with expertise in the particular technology area.
According to our baseline specification, patent invalidation leads to a highly significant increase
of follow-on invention, as measured by post-opposition forward citations. The effect is significant
for citations by other parties, whereas the effect is insignificant for self citations. We find that the
effect is most pronounced where patent invalidation should lead to a substantial gain in freedom
to operate for others. This is true, in particular, for discrete technology areas such as chemistry,
for technology fields without patent thickets, and for patents which are not protected by similar
patents of the same rights holder (patent fences). Besides, the effect is relevant mostly for small- and
medium-sized patent holders and, to a lesser extent, for large patent holders facing large follow-on
innovators. We do not find a significant effect on follow-on invention by small- and medium-sized
firms if the focal patent holder is large. This corresponds to the argument that large firms are
more likely in possession of complementary assets that can compensate for the loss of the exclusion
right. To summarize, we find a significant effect in those subsamples where the estimated marginal
blocking effect should approximate the overall effect of patent rights on cumulative innovation. In
our robustness tests, we can show that the impact of relative size, thickets, and fencing is visible
even within technology subsamples. Our results therefore suggest that patents induce bargaining
failure over cumulative innovation even where prior literature has argued that transaction costs are
low.
Recent empirical work has studied the existence of patent-induced impediments to cumulative
innovation in settings that differ with respect to the source and the scope of variation in patent
rights.6 Murray and Stern (2007) use difference-in-differences estimation models on a sample of
169 biotech patent-paper pairs. Likewise, Huang and Murray (2009) use 1,279 gene patent-paper
pairs. Both studies exploit the grant of patent protection as variation over time. They conclude that
patent protection impedes subsequent research based on the underlying discovery.7 Sampat and
Williams (2019) further investigate the relationship of patent rights on follow-on invention in human
genes by comparing citations to 1,545 successful and unsuccessful patent applications filed at the
USPTO. Their instrumental variable regressions do not show a blocking effect of human gene patents
6Table B-1 in the Appendix provides an overview of recent studies.
7Corroborating these findings, the results of Williams (2013) suggest that (non-patent) IP rights on a specific set of
genes led to a 20-30% decrease in subsequent scientific research and product development.
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on follow-on invention. Galasso and Schankerman (2015) investigate the effect of 1,357 patent
invalidations by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) on follow-on invention. They
address the endogeneity of the patent invalidation event by exploiting the randomized allocation
of judges at the CAFC to identify judge fixed effects.8 In their study, patent invalidation by the
CAFC results in an increase of follow-on invention in technology areas that are largely considered
complex, such as computers, electronics, and medical instruments. Moreover, they find that the
strongest effect emerges when patents of large firms are invalidated. To explain their results, they
point to the high transaction costs in complex technologies that make bargaining failure more likely.
Arguably, their findings are specific to their highly selective sample of litigation cases at the appellate
court for patent disputes, which makes an extrapolation to the patent population non-trivial. First,
given that patent disputes at the appellate court involve millions of dollars in litigation costs, the
individual patent rights in their sample must be very valuable. Hence, these patents are unlikely to be
embedded into thickets, fences, or other complementary assets. Selection to the CAFC thus singles
out those patents from an overall complex technology whose invalidation does result in FTO. Second,
the discrete technology patents litigated at the CAFC overwhelmingly stem from the pharmaceutical
sector. For these, invalidation is often pursued by generic companies to gain market approval for
an existing drug, rather than to clear the way for follow-on inventions.9 The combination of these
effects may lead to the impression that bargaining failure is present only in complex technologies.
We think that this conclusion may be misleading.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature on cumulative innovation with regard to
identification and interpretation, empirical scope and measurement, and the geographic and institu-
tional context. First, we present causal estimates of the effect of patents on cumulative innovation.
For a consistent interpretation of our empirical findings, we conceptualize a new framework which
incorporates the interplay of bargaining failure and freedom to operate. We point to cases where
we expect the difference between the marginal and the overall blocking effect of patents to be par-
ticularly large. To operationalize our framework, we study the heterogeneity of the invalidation
effect with respect to technology characteristics, firm size, and the patent landscape. Our findings
challenge the established view that inefficient licensing is limited to the domain of complex tech-
nology areas. Instead, we find strong evidence that bargaining failure is also prevalent in discrete
technologies. This result resonates strongly with the markets for technology literature, which has
found pervasive impediments to efficient licensing across technologies (Agrawal et al., 2015; Arora
and Gambardella, 2010; Gans and Stern, 2010).
Second, compared to previous work, our study stands out in the scope and scale of the underlying
data. With more than 33,000 oppositions filed between 1993 and 2011, our sample of patents
exceeds prior studies by more than an order of magnitude, despite the relatively short and recent
time frame. Furthermore, the fine-grained EP citation data used in this study alleviate a key point
of criticism concerning the use of forward citations as a proxy for cumulative innovation: strategic
8In a complementary study, Galasso and Schankerman (2018) use the same empirical setting to analyze the effect of
patent invalidation on subsequent research activities of the focal patent holder.
9These validity challenges occur in the context of so-called Paragraph IV litigation (Higgins and Graham, 2009).
Between 2002 and 2008 alone, the CAFC ruled on more than 220 unique drug patents (own calculations based on data
from ParagraphFour.com).
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and irrelevant citations (cf. Alcacer et al., 2009; Sampat, 2010). In contrast to the US patent system,
citations in Europe are produced (or at least verified) by highly trained EPO personnel during the
search and examination phase (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008). As a result, the average number of
EPO patent citations is lower, but their technological relevance is higher (Breschi and Lissoni, 2004).
Lastly, concerning the geographic and institutional context, we are the first to provide a source of
exogenous variation in patent rights at the European Patent Office. Given the economic significance
of European patents, the EPO’s decisions on patentability should be at least as important to the
involved parties as the corresponding decisions by the USPTO. Nonetheless, the European context
has so far been understudied. Concerning post-grant review, the literature has primarily focused on
the determinants of opposition (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Schneider, 2011; Harhoff et al., 2016)
and opposition as an error correction mechanism (Burke and Reitzig, 2007; Graham and Harhoff,
2014). We complement this literature, for the first time providing causal evidence for the effect of
oppositions on subsequent innovative behavior.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional frame-
work of patent opposition at the EPO. Section 3 provides details on the dataset, the dependent and
independent variables, and shows descriptive statistics. Section 5 then presents the econometric
analysis and a discussion of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Setting
The European Patent Office provides a harmonized application procedure for patent protection in
one or more member states of the European Patent Convention (EPC). As of now, a patent application
granted by the EPO does not lead to a single “European patent.” Instead, it is split into a bundle of
national patent rights, each entering the patent system of the respective member states. As these
rights exist independently of each other, the invalidation of a national patent in one country has no
effect on its counterparts in other countries.
However, in the first nine months after grant, third parties can challenge the validity of a Eu-
ropean patent at the EPO by filing an opposition against the granting decision. As its outcome is
binding for all designated states, the centralized opposition procedure represents the only option to
invalidate a patent right with coverage of multiple European countries in a single, relatively inex-
pensive step.10
2.1 Examination procedure
The majority of patent applications at the EPO are based on national first filings or international PCT
filings (see Harhoff and Wagner (2009) for a detailed description). Only a small share of filings takes
the EPO as its priority office. Publication of patent applications occurs at the EPO (as in many other
patent authorities) exactly 18 months after the priority date; the publication of the patent document
is acccompanied by the EPO Search Report. In the case of PCT filings, which are published by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an International Search Report is generated by an
10See Figure A-1 in the Appendix for a timeline of events for the average patent in our sample.
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International Search Authority (ISA). Most International Search Reports are actually generated by
the EPO. While the original patent application may contain many references to prior art inserted by
the applicant, only the prior art listed in the search report is relevant for the examination process.
The examiner has full control over the selection of prior art references already listed by the applicant
for inclusion into the search report, while also generating references via own search efforts.
Within six months after the publication of the search report compiled by the patent office, the
patent applicant has to request the examination of the patent application. If the applicant fails to do
so, the application is deemed to be withdrawn. With the end of the search procedure, the respon-
sibility for examining the application passes internally from the receiving section to an appointed
examining division, which consists of a primary examiner, a secondary examiner, and the chairman.
The primary examiner assesses whether the application and the invention meet the requirements
of the European Patent Convention and whether the invention is patentable based on the search
report. The primary examiner then either grants the patent directly, contingent on the approval by
the other two members of the division, or requests a reply from the applicant that addresses the
objections raised in the search report. If the objections are successfully overcome by the applicant,
the primary examiner sends the version in which he intends to grant the patent, including his own
amendments, to the applicant. After the applicant’s approval and the completion of formalities, such
as the payment of fees, the provision of translations, etc., the grant of the patent is published. The
publication date of the EPO B1 document is the official grant date of the patent.
Currently, it takes on average more than four years from the filing of the application to the final
decision on the grant of the patent (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). Since the grant comes along with
validation fees and costly translations into national languages, some applicants deliberately delay
the examination process. However, in order to make complementary investment decisions or to
claim injunctive relief before court, some applicants are interested in fast resolution of the patent
examination and file a request for accelerated examination.
2.2 Opposition procedure
The grant decision of the examination division is subject to a post-grant review mechanism, which is
initiated by filing a notice of opposition within nine months after the publication of the mention of
the patent grant. Oppositions can be filed by any party except the patent holder himself.11 Receiving
the notice of opposition, the primary examiner informs the patent holder and checks whether the
grounds for opposition are admissible. Oppositions may be filed on the grounds that the subject-
matter is not new or inventive, the invention is not sufficiently disclosed, or the granted patent
extends beyond the content of the application as filed.
Consisting of three technically qualified examiners, the appointed opposition division has to de-
cide whether the raised objections compromise the maintenance of the patent. If necessary, the
opposition division invites patent holder and opponent to file observations on the other party’s com-
munications. During this exchange of communications, the patent holder can amend the description,
claims and drawings of the patent. An oral proceeding is summoned if requested by one of the par-
11In case of multiple independently filed oppositions, all objections are dealt with in one combined proceeding.
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ties, including the opposition division itself. Despite being optional, the oral proceeding before the
opposition division is a rarely omitted part of the opposition procedure.
The opposition division usually states its decision verbally at the end of the oral proceeding. The
conclusion of the oral proceedings is either the invalidation of the patent in its entirety, the main-
tenance of the patent as is, or the maintenance of the patent in amended form. A written decision,
including the opposition division’s reasoning, typically follows one to six months afterwards. If no
oral proceeding was requested, the opposition division simply issues its decision in writing. Patent
applicant and/or opponent may appeal against the decision of the opposition division. The involve-
ment of the opposition division ends after the opposition phase. Appeal proceedings are heard by
judges forming the Boards of Appeal, a separate and independent decision-making body within the
EPO.
Withdrawals of oppositions may occur at any stage prior to the decision, but do not necessar-
ily terminate the opposition proceedings. The opposition division has the option to continue the
proceeding on its own motion (EPC Rule 84) and make a decision on the patent’s validity based
on the grounds of opposition previously stated. Since the opposed patent may still end up being
invalidated, settlements between opponent and patent holder are relatively rare events. More than
85% of all oppositions conclude in a decision by the opposition division.12
2.3 Appointment of examining and opposition division
Technically qualified examiners are assigned to technical art units, so-called directorates. Patent ap-
plications are allocated to technical art units according to the application’s underlying technology.13
The examining division regularly consists of the previous search examiner as first member and two
examiners appointed by the director as second member and chairman.14
The opposition division consists of a first examiner, a minute writer and a chairman. The director
appoints the members of the opposition division under consideration of the technical qualifications
relevant to the patent. The opposition division may be enlarged to a fourth member with a legal
background, if there are complex legal questions to be resolved.
As substantive examiners with the necessary technical qualification, the members of the exam-
ination division are natural candidates for the opposition division. Concerning the participation of
the grant examiners in the opposition proceeding, Article 19(2) of the European Patent Convention
states the following:
“An Opposition Division shall consist of three technically qualified examiners, at least
two of whom shall not have taken part in the proceedings for grant of the patent to
which the opposition relates. An examiner who has taken part in the proceedings for
the grant of the European patent may not be the Chairman.”
12According to our data (see Table B-2 in the Appendix), the patent holder surrenders the opposed patent in about
5.1% of all oppositions, whereas opponents withdraw their notice without continuation in about 7.7% of all oppositions.
13The technical art units are based in Berlin, Den Haag and Munich.
14The primary examiner used to be different from the search examiner. This has changed due to the “BEST” (“Bringing
Search and Examination Together”) initiative, with the goal to have search report as well as examination decision made
by the same examiner.
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Statements of interviewed EPO officials and our empirical findings show that the primary ex-
aminer of the examination division frequently participates in the opposition proceeding of the same
patent. Case law has established that the patent holder and the opponent cannot object the direc-
tor’s decision regarding the appointment of a particular examiner in the opposition division. The
opposition division’s decision can in principle be appealed on the ground of suspected lack of impar-
tiality among the division members. However, there are only very few cases where this has occurred;
the precedent cases that we are aware of refer to different allegations than the involvement in the
previous grant decision.15
3 Data
We use data on opposed patents granted at the EPO between 1993 and 2011 to empirically analyze
the causal effect of patent invalidation on follow-on invention. 1993 is taken as the starting point
of our data collection as this is the year when the members of the opposition division were – for
the first time – explicitly listed in the rulings of the opposition divisions. In order to allow for a
sufficiently large time span of 5 years for citations to occur, 2011 marks the last opposition decision
year of our data set. This section provides detailed information on our data sources, a discussion of
the variables we derive, and a selection of descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data sources
We construct a sample of all patents granted between 1993 and 2011 that became subject to an
opposition by drawing on several distinct patent data sources. For each granted patent at the EPO
we first observe in the EPO PATSTAT Register whether an opposition was filed within the statutory
period of nine months after the grant date.16 Via the patent application number, we gather all rele-
vant document files concerning the examination and the opposition procedure from the online file
inspection system of the European Patent Register.17 We read out documents on the grant decision,
the oral proceedings and the opposition decisions in order to extract the names of the examining
division and opposition division members, since this information is not available from patent data
providers.18 We elaborate on our read-out and parsing efforts in Appendix F. We rely on the proce-
dural steps data in the EPO PATSTAT Register to determine the result and date of the first instance
as well as the final decision of the opposition proceeding.19 Furthermore, the EPO PATSTAT Register
15For instance in the case G 0005/91 with a decision from May 5, 1992, a patent holder’s objection originated from a
former employment relationship between examiner and opponent.
16Unless otherwise noted below, we use the EPO PATSTAT Statistical Database – 2016 Spring Edition for the selection
of patent filings and for extracting citation information.
17The European Patent Register provides access to digital documents in the public part of a patent file (also known
as online file inspection or “file wrapper”). The documents are grouped by procedural stage and include the full written
correspondence between the EPO, the applicant, and the opponent. Outgoing communications become available online
on the day after the date of dispatch. Incoming communications become available once the filed document has been
coded by the EPO.
18For PCT patent applications with a filing date from 2011 onwards, the WIPO patent database contains information
on the examiner.
19The EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database represents an alternative data source. However, it contains only final
opposition outcomes with limited means to reconstruct the result of reversed first instance decisions.
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provides us with information on the name and address of the opponents. For bibliographic data on
the opposed patents, the patent holders, and forward citations, we again use the EPO Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database. A few important aspects of the examination process, such as the as-
signed technical art unit and the examination location, are not covered by any of the above patent
databases. We obtain those details from the EPO’s administrative database EPASYS (April 2015).
3.2 Dependent variable
A common way to capture a technology’s dependence on a past technology is to use citation data.
This approach assumes that a cited patent represents the exclusion right that is important when
determining the scope of patent protection of the citing patent application. To measure follow-on
invention to a focal patent, we therefore look at its number of forward citations in a fixed time
window after the opposition outcome. We discuss potential weaknesses of this approach below. As
we are most interested in analyzing the effect of the patent’s invalidation on follow-on invention, we
distinguish citing patents by their filing date relative to the date of invalidation. In order to link the
effect to inventive activity and not to application behavior, we use the earliest application filing date
within the DOCDB family of the citing patent. This is also the priority date of subsequent filings,
and thus closest to the actual date of invention of the presumed follow-on invention.
We further categorize forward citations by the citing party. Comparing names of the citing appli-
cant with the focal patent holder and the opponent, we distinguish between citations from patents
by the patent holder itself (“self citations”), and citations by third parties (“other citations”). In
contrast to the US patent system, most citations of European patent applications are generated by
the examiners during the search and examination phase and not by the applicant (Criscuolo and
Verspagen, 2008). We restrict the citations to those included in the EPO Search Report or the Inter-
national Search Report generated by the EPO as International Search Authority. These citations are
fully under the control of the examiner. Thus, by design of our dependent variable, we avoid the
use of measures impacted by (strategic) citation patterns which may occur when using US citation
data (cf. Alcacer et al., 2009; Sampat, 2010).20
While we maintain that EPO citations should be more suited to our analysis, it would be com-
forting to obtain qualitatively similar results when using USPTO data. Therefore, we replicate our
empirical analysis on the basis of USPTO citations and present the results in the Appendix. As infor-
mation on the origin of citations is only available for citations made from 2001 onwards, we include
both examiner and applicant citations published by the USPTO. Moreover, even the distinction avail-
able after 2001 may not be fully satisfactory, as US examiners add missing references, but do not
mark applicant-generated references as relevant or not. The European-type search report provides
that information.
20A prominently raised limitation of citation analyses is the lack of distinction between citations where the citing patent
is within the scope of protection of the cited patent, and citations where the citing patent is beyond the scope of protection
(cf. Sampat and Williams, 2019). In the latter case, a license to use the technology is not required, independent of the
cited patent’s invalidation – blurring the causal effect of patent rights on follow-on invention. Our setting alleviates this
issue. Prior studies have shown that EPO patent citations are of higher technological relevance than those produced by
the USPTO (Breschi and Lissoni, 2004).
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3.3 Independent variables
The independent variables used in the main empirical analysis capture characteristics of the oppo-
sition proceeding, the involved parties, and the focal patent.
Opposition variables
The decision of the opposition division may have three mutually exclusive results for the opposed
patent: “valid” (opposition rejected), “valid in amended form”, and “invalid”. We operationalize the
decision in line with Galasso and Schankerman (2015). Our “invalidated” indicator variable equals 1
for the outcomes “invalid” and “valid in amended form”, and 0 for the outcome “valid”. The decision
of the opposition division can be subject to appeal. In fact, almost half of all decisions in our sample
are appealed. However, the reversal rate of the Boards of Appeal is very low and skewed; that is, pro-
patent holder outcomes are more likely to be overruled in favor of the opponent than vice versa.21 As
appeals considerably delay the final outcomes of opposition proceedings to the effect of substantial
truncation in our sample, we focus on the first decision of the opposition division. We expect that
potential bias from disregarding appeals – if at all – understates the effect of invalidation.22
Patent holder, opponent and third party variables
Prior literature has found that the risk of bargaining failure between patent holder and potential
licensees varies by the vertical position and the size of the parties. Furthermore, the country of
residence may influence patenting and appropriation strategies. Hence, the selection of patents into
opposition, as well as the effect of the opposition outcome on follow-on invention, is likely a function
of patent holder, opponent, and third party characteristics.23 In line with previous work (Harhoff
and Reitzig, 2004), we include the sector (corporate entity or not), the country of residence, and the
patent portfolio size of each entity as independent dummy variables. See the explanations below
for details on coding.
Patent and procedural variables
We include patent value indicators and technology controls to reduce asymptotic variances and to
mitigate bias.24 To preempt endogeneity issues, we focus on patent value indicators that are set
at a very early stage of the patent application and are thus independent of the examination and
opposition proceedings. We include a dummy variable for international patent applications (PCT)
and count variables for DOCDB patent family size, IPC subclasses, claims, applicants, inventors and
21Which is in line with the established view that arguing against already identified novelty destroying prior art is
considerably more challenging than presenting new subject matter.
22A further reason to focus on the opposition outcome is the fact that our instrumental variable has a direct effect on
first instance outcomes, but merely an indirect effect on appeal outcomes.
23Harhoff et al. (2016) argue that non-corporate applicants hold on average patents of lower commercial value and
higher novelty, with implications for the selection into opposition.
24In order to show randomness of our instrumental variable, we test correlations with a set of further variables specific
to the patent examination process. These variables include the duration of examination, the language of the proceeding,
and the granted request for accelerated examination.
10
patent as well as non-patent backward citations. We include pre-opposition self and other citations
restricted to the first three years after filing as further proxy variables for patent value.
We assign each patent to a technology area by mapping the IPC classes in line with the concor-
dance table developed by the Fraunhofer ISI and the Observatoire des Sciences et des Technologies in
cooperation with the French patent office (cf. Schmoch, 2008). The IPC codes are clustered into 34
technology areas, each belonging to one of five main technological areas: (a) electrical engineering,
(b) instruments, (c) chemistry, (d) mechanical engineering, and (e) other fields.
Measures for FTO: patent thickets and patent fences
We are interested in how the effect of patent invalidation is dependent on further restrictions to
freedom to operate, in particular by other patent rights in the focal patent’s periphery. To this end,
we distinguish between patent thickets and patent fences and study corresponding subsamples. We
measure the (time variant) density of patent thickets in the focal patent’s technology area following
the methodology of Von Graevenitz et al. (2011). They identify constellations in which three patent
holders can mutually block each other. We expect that the more of these so-called triples exist in
a technology area, the likelier it is that the gain in FTO from patent invalidation is highly limited.
Besides thickets with mutual blocking potential between different holders, the focal patent may
also be embedded into a patent fence of several similar patents held by the same owner. To measure
similarity, we use a sophisticated semantic comparison of the patents’ full texts (abstract, description,
claims, and title; cf. Harhoff 2014). We then count the number of patents that are highly similar to
the focal patent within the same holder’s portfolio. If the invalidated patent is part of a such defined
fence, we expect that the focal patent holder is more likely to maintain the ability to restrict FTO
and to block follow-on invention.
3.4 Instrumental variable
The opposition division consists of three technically qualified substantive examiners, of which at
least two must not have taken part in the examination of the opposed patent. Opposition cases
are decided by a vote of all three persons on the opposition board.25 It seems like a natural as-
sumption that the examiner who granted the patent is generally more inclined to be in favor of the
patent holder than of the opponent, who dissents with the examiner’s prior decision. Given that this
pro-patent holder effect exists, two requirements must be fulfilled so that we can exploit the par-
ticipation of the examiner in the opposition proceeding as an instrumental variable. First, we need
continuous variation in examiner participation across time and within cohorts. Second, we must be
able to exclude any endogeneity in the determination whether the patent examiner participates in
the opposition division or not.
We conducted interviews with EPO officials to explore the process by which opposition divisions
are formed. These discussions revealed that the reasons for the participation of the examiner are
found in the non-availability of other examiners with expertise in the particular technology area.
25Voting follows a simple majority. In case of parity (when a fourth legal member is present), the vote of the chairman
is decisive.
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Notes: This graph shows the annual rate of examiner participation in opposition proceedings by technology main area.
The sample includes oppositions with first outcome after 2011.
If the number of substantive examiners relative to the technical unit’s current workload is large,
the granting examiner is less likely to take part in the opposition proceeding as the third member
of the division. The supply of substantive examiners depends inter alia on the labor market – staff
shortage induces the granting examiner to become indispensable for the opposition proceeding. Fig-
ure 1 shows that the average participation rate is well above 60% before 2003, but then declines
to an average rate of about 55% with increasing variations between technology main areas. This
drop is caused by a sharp increase in the number of substantive examiners eligible to participate
in opposition proceedings in the course of the “BEST” initiative.26 Additionally, Table C-1 in the
Appendix shows the relationship between the examiner participation rate and capacity constraints
at the respective technical unit in panel regressions. Even when controlling for the full set of tech-
nical unit and time fixed effects, concurrent capacity constraints – measured by the share of patent
applications whose search report was not completed before the first publication 18 months after
priority filing (see Haeussler et al. (2014) for details) – are negatively associated with the examiner
participation rate.27 We hence conclude that the event “examiner participation in opposition pro-
ceeding” is plausibly exogenous to the focal patent and shows the necessary continuous variation
within cohorts and technology areas to serve as an instrument.
26The “BEST” (“Bringing Search and Examination Together”) initiative had the goal to have the search report and
examination decision made by the same examiner. For this purpose, search examiners were – on a large scale – trained
and promoted to substantive examiners.
27Notably, capacity constraints at the technical unit before (and after) the appointment of the opposition division have
a considerably weaker effect on the examiner participation rate, which supports the notion that temporal staff shortages
drive the decision to appoint the granting examiner to the opposition division (see Figure A-2a in the Appendix).
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To further argue against potential endogeneity, we discuss the instrument’s randomness and its
adherence to the exclusion restriction. In Table C-2, we show that common patent value indicators
as well as characteristics of the patent holder and opponent do not show any significant effect on the
likelihood of the examiner’s participation in the opposition proceeding. This supports the view of
EPO officials and patent attorneys that the participation or absence of the examiner is independent
of the opposed patent and beyond the influence of the patent holder or the opponent. However,
one legitimate concern is that the duration of examination may affect the likelihood of examiner
participation as well as follow-on citations. An applicant with a considerable pipeline of follow-on
inventions may be interested in having the patent granted as quickly as possible. As prior empirical
analyses (e.g., Harhoff and Wagner, 2009) have shown, the duration of examination is not perfectly
exogenous, because the applicant can speed up or delay the examination process. This may present
a problem to the instrumental variable if the duration of the proceeding affects the examiner’s avail-
ability to participate in the opposition proceeding. For instance, the granting examiner may become
unavailable due to retirement, promotion, or transfer to a different technical art unit. However, our
sample does not show any effect of examination length on the likelihood of the examiner’s partici-
pation in the opposition proceeding. Accelerated examination constitutes an additional issue. Even
when controlling for length of examination, the request of accelerated examination positively affects
the participation dummy. We assume this is due to the fact that the accelerated examination request
releases the examiner from further duties and provides him with a free schedule to participate in
the opposition proceeding. To underline the robustness of our instrument, we remove cases with
accelerated examination (about 11% of the sample) in a robustness test, yet we find no significant
changes throughout our results.
A random instrument could still violate the exclusion restriction if the outcome is affected
through different ways than just the first stage. This would be the case if the applicant foresaw
whether the examiner is part of the opposition proceeding before the decision on the patent’s va-
lidity, providing him with enough time to adjust his behavior accordingly. However, this seems very
unlikely. While the composition of the division is set at the beginning of the opposition proceeding,
all correspondence between the applicant or the opponent and the EPO is channeled through the
formalities officer. Only at the time of the oral proceeding, which usually ends in a decision on the
case, the opposition division members become known to the parties.28 The applicant may also be
able to foresee whether the examiner is part of the opposition proceeding if examiner-specific par-
ticipation rates are concentrated at zero and at one. As can be seen from Figure A-2b, this concern
is unfounded.
4 Descriptive Statistics
We count 49,938 patents granted between 1993 and 2011 with opposition at the EPO. Since the com-
position of the examination and opposition board is essential to construct our instrumental variable,
our sample is limited to those patents where we are able to gather the names of the examiners
28In those cases where applicant and opponent waive the oral proceeding, the parties learn about the identity of the
opposition division members only through the published decision.
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All oppositions Share in sample
Notes: This graph includes all opposition proceedings (at the patent level) with grant date between 1993 and 2011. The
low sample rate in the first year is due to the fact that the EPO introduced the grant document type that contains examiner
names only in mid of 1993. The used sample includes oppositions with first outcome after 2011.
involved in the grant and opposition decisions. For several reasons outlined in Table B-2, we are
forced to exclude about 17% of patents, leading to a sample size of 41,358 patents. We assume that
this selection has little relevance to our subsequent analysis. The fact that the excluded patents are
equally distributed over time (cf. Figure 2) supports this view.
A second sample restriction comes into play when constructing the follow-on citation variables.
To mitigate truncation effects for more recently invalidated patents, we exclude patents with a first
instance opposition decision after 2011. This reduces our main sample of analysis to 33,075 obser-
vations at the patent level.
Opposition proceedings usually result in one of three distinct outcomes for the opposed patent:
valid, amended, or invalid. In line with prior analyses of oppositions at the EPO, we find fairly equal
shares across the three outcomes. Yet, time trends appear to exist in our sample (see Figure 3a):
invalidations have seen a moderate increase over the last 20 years, whereas fewer patents survive
opposition perfectly unscathed.
The opposition rates across technology fields differ substantially (Harhoff et al., 2016). Figure
3b shows that with negligible variation over time the predominant share of oppositions in our sample
are filed against patents in the technology areas “Chemistry” and “Mechanical Engineering.”
We present the summary statistics of patent and procedural characteristics in Table 1. Among
the patent characteristics, we distinguish between self/other forward citations within three years
after filing and self/other forward citations within five years after the opposition decision. While
the latter represent our dependent variables of interest, we include the former, which are indepen-
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Table 1: Patent and procedural characteristics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Patent characteristics
Self forward citations (3 years after filing) 0.39 0.99 0 20
Other forward citations (3 years after filing) 0.87 1.85 0 84
Self forward citations (5 years after decision) 0.14 0.52 0 10
Other forward citations (5 years after decision) 0.80 1.47 0 34
Age of patent (yr) 8.84 2.47 3 26
DOCDB family size 10.75 10.56 1 263
No of patent holders 1.07 0.32 1 13
No of inventors 2.61 1.76 1 21
No of claims 13.12 10.05 0 329
No of IPC subclasses 2.74 2.45 1 56
No of patent backward references 6.31 4.82 0 128
No of non-patent backward references 1.15 3.39 0 110
PCT application (d) 0.44 0.50 0 1
Year of application filing 1996.22 4.71 1981 2008
Year of grant decision 2001.01 4.62 1993 2010
Patent technology main area
Electrical Engineering (d) 0.10 0.31 0 1
Chemistry (d) 0.39 0.49 0 1
Instruments (d) 0.13 0.33 0 1
Mechanical Engineering (d) 0.31 0.46 0 1
Other Fields (d) 0.06 0.24 0 1
Examination proceeding
Duration filing to examination (yr) 1.72 1.22 0 18
Duration of examination (yr) 3.98 1.80 0 16
Accelerated examination (d) 0.11 0.31 0 1
Opposition proceeding
Examiner participation (d) 0.68 0.47 0 1
Outcome: valid (d) 0.29 0.45 0 1
Outcome: invalid (d) 0.71 0.45 0 1
Appeal (d) 0.46 0.50 0 1
Outcome reversal (d) 0.07 0.26 0 1
Observations 33,075
Notes: This table presents characteristics of the patent and examination as well as opposition proceeding at the level of
opposition cases.
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Figure 3: Time trends in oppositions
















































Notes: Both graphs include all opposition proceedings (at the patent level) which are part of our main sample of analysis.
Grant year 2010 includes only 21 opposition proceedings and is not displayed.
dent of the subsequent opposition proceeding, as control variables. As further exogenous patent
value indicators we draw on the DOCDB family size and counts of applicants, inventors, claims, IPC
subclasses and backward references. With application filing years between 1981 and 2008, the av-
erage patent has spent about 4 years in examination and is close to 9 years old when the opposition
division decides on its validity. That is, opposition outcomes occur relatively early in patent life and
are far less spread across a patent’s lifespan than the outcome in patent litigation (see Figure A-3a).
Concerning the opposition proceeding, the average participation rate of an examiner in the oppo-
sition division is about 68%, with considerable variation over time and technology areas as already
elaborated in Section 3.4. Almost half of all opposition decisions are appealed before the EPO’s
board of appeals. However, the reversal rate (computed as the share of all cases where the appeal
outcome is different from the opposition outcome) stands at mere 7%. Moreover, appeals initiated
by the patent holder, for which the decision in first instance was rather in favor of the opponent, are
even less commonly reversed than vice versa (see Figure B-3).
Oppositions are mostly filed by corporations and directed at corporate patent holders. Table 3
shows that 94% of patent holders and 98% of opponents are companies with practically no involve-
ment of parties from the academic or non-profit sector.29 The opposition proceeding may consolidate
multiple notices of opposition that were filed during the nine months window after grant. On aver-
age, about 1.3 parties represent the validity challenging side. We account for cases with more than
one opponent in our subsequent empirical analysis.
The distribution of the patent holders’ countries of residence is very similar to the overall distri-
bution among all granted patents. Naturally, as the grant of EP patents affects primarily companies
active in EPC countries, the share of opponents with residence in one of these countries is consid-
erably higher in comparison. To capture effects varying with the patent holder’s size, we classify
29EPO caselaw has rendered the use of a “straw man” representing the real party interested in the opposition eligible.
In those rare occasions, our data reference a law firm or a single patent attorney as opponent.
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Table 2: Characteristics of patent holder and opponent
Patent holder Opponent
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Number of parties 1.07 0.31 1 11 1.28 0.76 1 19
Sector
Company (d) 0.94 0.25 0 1 0.98 0.15 0 1
Country of residence
EPC (excl. GB) (d) 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.83 0.37 0 1
GB (d) 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
US (d) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.10 0.29 0 1
JP (d) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1
Other (d) 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1
Size
Large (d) 0.38 0.49 0 1 –
Medium (d) 0.28 0.45 0 1 –
Small (d) 0.34 0.47 0 1 –
Observations 33,075 33,075
Notes: This table presents characteristics of the patent holder(s) and the opponent(s) at the level of opposition cases.
In case of multiple citing patent holders or opponents, we give preference according to the ordering of sector, country
of residence, and size. Size categories are proxied by the number of patents (incl. applications) filed during the last five
years prior to the opposition decision (large: 200 and more patents, medium: 20 and more patents, small: fewer than 20
patents).
the patent holder as either small, medium or large according to his patent portfolio. This measure
seems less appropriate to proxy the opponent’s size.30 As we are more interested in the size of all
firms with follow-on invention activities, we disregard this aspect of the opponent.
We capture follow-on inventions by the number of forward citations the focal patent receives
within the first five years after the opposition outcome. In line with prior empirical analyses, we
distinguish between “self citations”, where the citing applicant and the focal patent holder are the
same entity, and “other citations”, where the citing applicant and the focal patent holder are different
entities. We focus on forward citations linking two patent families on the basis of patent applica-
tions published by the EPO or the WIPO. The EPO/WIPO citation data are unusually rich, letting
us distinguish between citations by the applicant and the examiner, and providing information on
the technological relevance of the cited patent. As can be seen from Table 3, citation characteristics
differ between self citation and other citations. If the citing applicant is also the holder of the cited
patent, the citation is more likely to originate from himself than from an examiner.31
30For instance, oppositions are sometimes filed by law firms on behalf of an undisclosed third party.
31This suggests that citation data based on applicant information only may be prone to substantial bias.
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Table 3: Characteristics of EP/WO forward citations by relationship to cited patent
Self citations Other citations
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Publication authority
EPO 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1
WIPO 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.55 0.50 0 1
Citation characteristics
Citation lag (yr) 10.18 2.71 1 22 10.44 2.88 1 25
DOCDB family size 6.79 5.64 1 85 5.92 5.50 1 254
Sector (citing applicant)
Company (d) 0.98 0.15 0 1 0.92 0.28 0 1
Country (citing applicant)
EPC (excl. GB) (d) 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.57 0.49 0 1
GB (d) 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
US (d) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
JP (d) 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1
Other (d) 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Size (citing applicant)
Large (d) 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1
Medium (d) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
Small (d) 0.21 0.40 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
Observations 4,139 25,413
Notes: This table includes examiner forward citations for patents subject to opposition proceedings in our main sample
of analysis. The unit of observation is the citation. We only consider citation links established in search reports issued
by the EPO. In case of multiple citations coming from the same patent family, we keep the earliest citation. In case of
multiple citing applicants, we give preference according to the ordering of sector, country of residence, and size. Size
categories are proxied by the number of patents (incl. applications) filed during the last five years prior to the opposition
decision (large: 200 and more patents, medium: 20 and more patents, small: fewer than 20 patents).
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5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Baseline specification and identification strategy
Our data on oppositions is a cross section where the unit of observation is the opposition proceeding
involving the unique patent p. Our main empirical specification is
log (Forward citationsp) = β1 Invalidatedp + β2 Patentp + β3 Patent holderp +
+ β4 Opponentp + β5 Agep + β6 Yearp + β7 Techp + εp.
The coefficient β1 captures the effect of invalidation on subsequent forward citations the opposed
patent receives. If patent rights have a positive or no impact on follow-on invention, we would expect
β1 ≤ 0. Vice versa, a finding of β1 > 0 would suggest that patents block follow-on invention.
Our dependent variable captures the number of forward citations within the first five years after
the opposition outcome. We distinguish between forward citations in total, those from patents
held by the focal patent holder himself (“self citations”) and those from patents held by others
(“other citations”). To control for heterogeneity in the value that the patent has for the patent
holder and follow-on inventors, we include patent value indicators, such as the number of claims
and the number of self citations and other citations received within the first three years after filing
as covariates in the regression. We also include age, grant year, decision year, and technology field
dummies to control for additional heterogeneity that may correlate with the opposition outcome
and subsequent citations.
As previous studies have amply illustrated, our main empirical challenge is the endogeneity of
the opposition division’s decision to invalidate the patent. More valuable inventions may lead to
more forward citations, but may also induce the patent holder to heavily defend the patent. This
negative correlation, biasing the OLS estimate of β1, renders this specification inappropriate to esti-
mate causal effects. To address this endogeneity, we need an instrument that affects the likelihood of
patent invalidation, but does not belong directly in the citations equation, hence creating exogenous
variation in patent invalidation.
We construct our instrument around the participation of the primary examiner in the opposition
proceeding – an approach new to the literature, which has focused on the use of decision maker fixed
effects (Sampat and Williams, 2019; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015). Following the basic intuition
that the primary examiner is more likely to come to the same conclusion concerning the validity of
the patent as in the examination proceeding than an arbitrary examiner, namely a confirmation of the
patentability of the subject matter, we expect his participation to negatively affect the probability
of invalidation. To verify this, we use probit estimation models to regress the binary opposition
outcome variable “Invalidated” on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous
variables x,
Prob (Invalidatedp) = Φ (γ1Examiner participationp + γxp)
→ Predicted probability of invalidationp . (5.1)
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We find strong evidence that examiner participation indeed has an effect on the opposition out-
come (p-value< 0.001). More importantly, we use the probit regression to obtain a fitted probability
(propensity score) of invalidation for each observation, which we use as our instrument throughout
the paper. We then apply standard Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression analysis, instrument-
ing the dummy of the opposition outcome with the predicted probability, 32
Invalidatedp = α1 Predicted probabilityp +αxp + up
log (Forward citationsp) = β1 ÛInvalidatedp +βxp + εp . (5.2)
In Table 4, columns (1) and (2), we report detailed results of the probit regression models of
the invalidation dummy on the examiner participation dummy. The estimated effect in column (1)
indicates that examiner participation is associated with a decrease of about 6.6 percentage points in
the likelihood of invalidation. The results are similar when we add the full set of control variables
(cf. column (2)) – examiner participation is associated with a highly significant decrease of about 4
percentage points in the probability of invalidation. We also find that patents with a larger number
of claims are more likely to be invalidated, whereas variables concerning the time until grant have
no significant effect.
Column (3) explores the interrelation of the observable control variables with examiner partici-
pation to provide some additional perspective concerning the exogeneity assumption. Variables with
the potential to raise concerns have statistically insignificant coefficients close to zero. For a more
detailed overview, especially concerning patent characteristics, see Table C-2 in the Appendix.
For a regression-based comparison of patent characteristics (analogous to simple t-tests) with
respect to the opposition outcome and with respect to the examiner participation instrument, see
Tables C-3 and C-4 in the Appendix, respectively. Invalidated opposed patents are found to have
significantly larger DOCDB family sizes, a larger share of PCT applications, more inventors, more
claims, more patent literature references and more forward citations than non-invalidated opposed
patents, underlining the necessity of an instrumental variables approach. In contrast, patents with
and without examiner participation do not differ in a significant way.
Note that weak identification is never an issue in the 2SLS regressions in the following, with
heteroskedasticity-robust first-stage F -statistics ranging from >70 for one of the considered sub-
samples to 500 for the full sample.
32The resulting estimator is asymptotically efficient in the class of estimators where the instrumental variables are
functions of all exogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 939, Procedure 21.1).
20
Table 4: Examiner participation and opposition outcome (EP/WO citations)
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Invalidated (d) Invalidated (d) Examiner participation (d)
Exam. participation (d) −0.066∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)






Duration of examination (yr) −0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.007)
Duration of wait (yr) 0.009 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Year effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects No Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes†
Patent holder characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗
Opponent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Model degrees of freedom 1 111 110
χ2-statistic 154.3 1,812.5 2,772.1
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.061 0.073
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: The probit regressions in columns (1) and (2) illuminate the relevance of the “Examiner participation” dummy
for the outcome of the opposition proceeding. The invalidation predictions of the probit regression in column (2) – or
equivalent predictions for subsamples and other citation measures – are used as the instrument in the 2SLS instrumental
variables regressions throughout the paper. Column (3) shows the probit regression of the “Examiner participation”
dummy on the other exogenous variables. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include
patents with no forward citations. A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can
be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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5.2 Results and discussion
In Table 5 we examine how patent invalidation or partial invalidation in an opposition proceed-
ing affects the number of subsequent EP/WO forward examiner citations. Column (1) shows the
baseline OLS regression of the logarithmized number of forward citations of parties other than the
focal patent holder within five years after the opposition decision on the invalidity dummy and an
extensive set of control variables. The correlation between patent invalidation and future citations
is insignificant and close to zero. In contrast, turning to the 2SLS instrumental variables regres-
sion in column (2), we find a highly significant positive coefficient. The obvious discrepancy from
the OLS estimate is in line with the expected endogeneity of invalidation, a suspicion confirmed
on the 5% level by a test of endogeneity. The estimated coefficient implies that patent invalidation
causes a significant increase in citations by other parties in the five years following the opposition
outcome. Note that the instrument explains a sizable part of the variation in patent invalidation,
which is underlined by the first stage heteroskedasticity-robust F -statistic of 500 – a value that easily
exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) (i.i.d. error) critical values for weak identification tests. Column
(3) presents the results of the same baseline specification, however, with the dependent variable
restricted to citations from patents held by the focal patent holder himself. We find a weakly signifi-
cant, positive effect of invalidation on the focal patent holder’s follow-on inventive activity. Column
(4) presents the results of the baseline specification on the total number of citations. In order to
examine potential differences in the invalidation effect with respect to patent age and value, Table
6 shows the results for sample splits at the age median of 8 years and the DOCDB family size me-
dian of 8. The effect seems to be primarily driven by younger and more valuable patents, whose
invalidation triggers a statistically significant increase in forward citations by others.
The following four tables disentangle the average invalidation effect on other citations by envi-
ronments that should differ in their prevalence of bargaining failure and in the gain in freedom to
operate after patent removal. We first split our sample by technology area and by the complexity of
the focal patent’s technology field. Afterwards, we distinguish between the sizes of both the focal
and the citing patent holder. Finally, we group patents by the presence of patent thickets in their
field and by whether the patent is part of a patent fence, i.e., a portfolio of very similar patents.
First, Table 7 lists the estimation results on subsamples defined by technology main area. While
the coefficients for “Electrical Engineering”, “Instruments” and “Chemistry” are all positive, the latter
is the only one with statistical significance. It appears that the effect of invalidation on citations
by others is most coherent in “Chemistry” – an area which is commonly associated with discrete
technologies, while “Electrical Engineering” and “Instruments” predominantly encompass complex
technologies.
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Table 5: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.008 0.292∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.074) (0.033) (0.077)
log(No of claims) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.005† 0.127∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 221.8 221.8 221.8
Weak identification test 504.8 504.8 504.8
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation
on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured by EP/WO
examiner forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision of the opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4)
show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held by other parties than the
focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner himself and on the total number
of follow-on patents, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents
with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding
probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables.
The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM
and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of
the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors
presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
23
Table 6: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent age and value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Younger Older Smaller family Larger family
Invalidated (d) 0.242∗ 0.144 0.129 0.330∗∗
(0.119) (0.103) (0.100) (0.106)
log(No of claims) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.172∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.033∗∗ 0.005 0.030∗ 0.015
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗∗ Yes†
Underidentification test 93.1 129.3 38.7 155.7
Weak identification test 182.4 255.9 205.9 249.8
Observations 16,981 16,094 17,188 15,880
Notes: This table explores the differences of the invalidation effect with respect to the age of the focal patent at the time
of the opposition division’s decision and with respect to the size of its DOCDB family, a common patent value indicator. In
columns (1) and (2) we split the sample at the age median (8 years), where “Younger” refers to patents of age ≤ 8 years
and “Older” refers to patents of age> 8 years. In columns (3) and (4) the sample is split at the median DOCDB family size
(8 members), “Smaller family” referring to patents with a family size≤ 8, “Larger family” referring to patents with a family
size> 8. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In
each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak
identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively,
as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained
in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.
Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 7: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology main areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Technology area Electr Eng Instruments Chemistry Mech Eng
Invalidated (d) 0.183 0.308 0.299∗∗ 0.055
(0.194) (0.248) (0.102) (0.166)
log(No of claims) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.085∗∗ 0.023 0.005 0.034∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.011) (0.016)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Underidentification test 32.5 50.8 122.3 43.0
Weak identification test 75.5 64.0 256.4 77.0
Observations 3,432 4,220 13,011 10,384
Notes: Columns (1)–(4) show the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner forward citations to patents held by parties
other than the focal patent holder for the technology main area subsamples Electrical Engineering, Instruments, Chemistry
and Mechanical Engineering, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include
patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the correspond-
ing probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables.
The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM
and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of
the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors
presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Second, given that the fairly large standard errors for “Electrical Engineering” and “Instruments”
hint at potential heterogeneity in the invalidation effect, we now split the sample by the nature of
the underlying technology and by the size of the focal patent holder. In Table 8 column (1), we
restrict our sample to complex technology areas, resulting in no significant effect of invalidation
on forward citations by others. In contrast, the subsample of patents in “discrete” technologies in
Column (2) shows a highly significant positive invalidation effect. These results go hand in hand
with the common perception of differences between complex and discrete technologies. While the
protection of an invention in discrete technologies is concentrated in a single patent, resulting in
considerable gain in FTO for others in the case of an invalidation, inventions in complex technologies
are typically spread across two or more patents, diminishing the implications of an invalidation for
FTO. We further explore this channel in Table 10. Column (3) and Column (4) concern the size
of the focal patent holder. We find a much stronger and highly significant effect of invalidation on
citations by others if the focal patent holder is small (or medium-sized). This result is in line with
the argument that large firms are more likely to hold complementary assets that allow to keep up
market entry barriers. In contrast, small (and medium-sized) firms are less able to compensate for
the loss of the exclusion right. In turn, invalidation may create FTO for potential market entrants.
Third, motivated by our findings on patent holder size, in Table 9 we further explore the het-
erogeneity of the invalidation effect with respect to the differences in size between the owner of
the citing patent (dependent variable) and the owner of the focal patent (subsample). Columns
(1) and (2) show the effects of invalidation of a large holder’s patent on follow-on invention by
large and small patent holders, respectively. While the coefficient for large follow-on patent holders
is marginally significant and positive, the coefficient for small (and medium-sized) patent holders
facing a large focal patent holder is insignificant. In contrast, for columns (3) and (4), which dis-
play the corresponding effects for the invalidation of a patent held by a small owner, we find highly
significant coefficients. More specifically, the effect on small other parties appears stronger than the
one for large other parties. These results imply an ordering with regard to the marginal blocking
effect in the context of further entry barriers that may limit FTO. The observed effect on follow-on
innovation is most pronounced for small focal patent holders and small follow-on innovators (4),
significant for small original applicants and large subsequent innovators (3), marginally significant
for large focal patent holders and large follow-on innovators (1) and close to zero for large origi-
nal applicants and small subsequent applicants (2). This is consistent with intuition: While small
firms may struggle to efficiently negotiate a path for follow-on invention building on a second small
firm’s patented invention, they are free to operate after an invalidation (4). However, small firms
are unable to profit from the invalidation of a patent held by a large company, which is able to
retain protection of its invention by further patents or by complementary assets (2). Although this
logic may apply to large focal patent holders facing small follow-on innovators, it seems to be less
applicable for those faced with a large competitor, where the invalidation shows a marginally signif-
icant positive effect (1). Finally, although small patent holders enjoy some protection against large
follow-on innovators as long as the patent right is in place (3), it is not as effective as against small
subsequent innovators. It seems that large follow-on innovators are more capable of building on an
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Table 8: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology and patent holder size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Complex Discrete Large Small
Invalidated (d) 0.097 0.369∗∗∗ 0.086 0.378∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.092) (0.140) (0.088)
log(No of claims) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.031∗ 0.017† 0.019† 0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes†
Underidentification test 78.0 135.5 63.9 171.0
Weak identification test 191.1 313.3 147.1 350.9
Observations 14,946 18,129 11,038 22,037
Notes: This table shows the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner forward citations to patents held by parties other
than the focal patent holder for different sample splits. Columns (1) and (2) compare the effect in complex technologies
to that in discrete technologies, columns (3) and (4) compare the effect for patents held by large patent holders to that
for patents held by small (non-large) patent holders. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with
the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other
exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
invalidated patent when the original applicant is small (1 vs 3).
Fourth, to further inquire into the findings for complex technologies (Table 8), we discuss the
invalidation effect in the presence of patent thickets and patent fences in Table 10. In columns (1)
and (2) the sample is split into technology fields with high and low prevalence of patent thickets,
respectively. Consistent with intuition, we do not find a significant effect of invalidation in fields
with thickets, i.e., with a high number of mutually blocking relationships of at least three patent
holders. In contrast, we find a positive and significant effect for those technology fields without
extensive thickets. Similarly, there is no significant effect for patents protected by a fence, i.e., those
protected by the presence of one or more similar patents in the focal patent holder’s portfolio. In
contrast, there is a strong and highly significant effect if patent fences are absent.
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Table 9: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – by sizes of focal and citing patent holders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExa. . . Post5Other) Large Small Large Small
Patent holder subsample Large Large Small Small
Invalidated (d) 0.159† −0.067 0.190∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.085) (0.127) (0.050) (0.078)
log(No of claims) 0.013† 0.039∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.023∗ 0.002 0.023∗∗ 0.017†
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes Yes∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗
Underidentification test 63.9 63.9 171.0 171.0
Weak identification test 147.1 147.1 350.9 350.9
Observations 11,038 11,038 22,037 22,037
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations with respect to the differences in size
between the holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and the holder of the focal patent (subsample). Columns
(1) and (2) show the effect of invalidation on citations to patents held by large and small (non-large) patent owners,
respectively, for the subsample of patents held by large patent owners, columns (3) and (4) analogously for the subsample
of patents held by small patent owners. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents
with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding
probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables.
The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM
and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of
the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors
presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 10: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.031 0.229∗∗ 0.195 0.369∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.082) (0.135) (0.086)
log(No of claims) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.028 0.011 0.013 0.038∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 64.4 179.7 68.8 171.7
Weak identification test 81.0 425.5 116.7 392.0
Observations 3,239 28,494 8,826 24,233
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the presence or absence of
patent thickets and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent
thicket in the focal patent’s technology area. We consider a thicket to be present if the area triples variable derived by
Von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th percentile in the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect
of invalidation for a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent fence erected by the holder of the focal patent.
We consider a fence to be present if we find at least one similar patent by the focal patent owner prior to opposition. The
similarity measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims, the technology area and the full text of the patent. One
is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS
regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on
the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification
tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated
groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels:
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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5.3 Robustness tests
Robustness across main technology area subsamples
To verify that the results reported in Tables 9 and 10 are not exclusively driven by a single technology
area, we report analogous regressions for the chemistry and the electrical engineering / instruments
subsamples in Tables D-1 to D-4, finding qualitatively very similar coefficients.
Exclusion of particular cases
Table D-5 shows that our results are not merely artifacts of very particular patents or final outcomes.
In column (1) we exclude “dead” patents, i.e., patents solidified in the opposition proceeding which
lapse prior to the end of the citation window 5 years after the opposition decision. Column (2)
presents the results with patents with accelerated examinations excluded, to rule out the possibility
that the effect is solely driven by patents of special interest to the applicant. To mitigate concerns
addressing the use of the opposition decision instead of the final outcome of a potential appeal, in
columns (3) and (4) we exclude all cases in which an appeal leads to a reversal of the opposition
decision and in which any appeal is filed, respectively.
Focus on the extensive margin
Additionally, we limit our count of forward citations to the first of each unique follow-on innovator
within the respective time frame. This operationalization allows us to estimate the effect of inval-
idation on the extensive margin of follow-on invention. The results are very similar to the ones in
our main section (see Table D-6).
Bootstrapped standard errors
In analogy to Table 5, Table D-7 shows bootstrapped instead of robust standard errors. The boot-
strapping procedure includes both the probit invalidity probability prediction stage and the subse-
quent 2SLS instrumental variable estimation. Bootstrapped and robust standard errors are quanti-
tatively very similar, leading to identical conclusions concerning the significance levels of the inval-
idation coefficient.
Dummy citation variables
The regressions of Table D-8 follow our baseline specification with all citation variables replaced
with the corresponding dummy variables indicating that at least one citation has been made. The
results closely reproduce the findings of Table 5.
Alternative definition of opposition outcome
We further test whether the results are robust to an alternative operationalization of our indepen-
dent variable of interest “invalidation”. Instead of treating all patents subject to an amendment
as invalidated, we choose a demarcation based on the relative loss of patent scope due to opposi-
tion. Patents that lose a smaller number of claims relative to the median of all amendment cases
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(N = 5,415) are treated as remaining valid. The coefficients are quite similar to the ones when
using the standard operationalization but less precisely estimated (see Table D-9 and D-10).
Exclusion of citations by focal patent’s examiner
To rule out potential concerns that the involvement of the focal examiner in the opposition proceed-
ing may modify his powers of recall, we include only those citations, for which we can exclude that
they were made by the focal patent’s examiner (Table D-11). Due to resulting data restrictions we
have to limit the sample to patents with an application filing year ≥ 2001. Despite a substantial
reduction in the number of observations and in the citation count, the results closely resemble those
of Table 7. We can hereby rule out potentially modified powers of recall (when a focal examiner
involved in the opposition proceeding is compiling subsequent search reports) as a main driver of
the observed effect.
US citations
Tables US-4 to US-10 demonstrate that all findings are qualitatively similar when using US citations.
This alternative measure of follow-on invention results in a dependent variable with much higher
variation and more non-zero observations (see Figure A-3b in the Appendix). Besides, we are able
to rule out the citation behavior of EP/WO examiners as the key driver of the effect.
Timing of the invalidation effect
Figure 4 provides some insights into the timing of the invalidation effect. For each year after the
opposition outcome, we run IV regressions with a dummy dependent citation variable indicating
whether or not a patent has been cited in the respective time span.
Significant coefficients of invalidation are only found starting from the third year after opposi-
tion, with the third and the sixth year showing particularly large effects. This supports the inter-
pretation that a true change in follow-on invention underlies the increase in the citation likelihood.
Conversely, it further attenuates the potential concern that the effect is mainly driven by the examin-
ers’ increased attention and memory for invalidated patents when searching prior art for subsequent
inventions, which one would expect to set in immediately. Figures A-4a and A-4b show the corre-
sponding results for the chemistry and the electrical engineering / instruments subsamples.
Local average treatment effect
In a potential-outcomes framework, IV estimates of the invalidation coefficient can be interpreted as
the local average treatment effect on “complier” patents, i.e., patents whose invalidation status can
be changed by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Tables C-5 and C-6 explore the size and
the characteristics of the complier patent subpopulation. Depending on the (binary) instrument,
complier patents are estimated to constitute a share of around 6% to 20% of the patent population.
The composition of the complier subpopulation is found to be very similar to the composition of the
entire sample with respect to a diverse range of characteristics.
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Figure 4: Timing of the invalidation effect
*** * ** *** ** **
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Notes: Blue points depict the coefficients of invalidation resulting from IV regressions for each year after opposition
outcome, where as the dependent variable we use a dummy citation variable indicating whether or not a patent has been
cited in the respective time span. The usual independent citation control variables (Pre3Self and Pre3Other) are also
replaced by dummies. Error bars show the corresponding lower and upper 95% confidence limits. The significance levels
are indicated by stars below each parameter estimate.
5.4 Discussion
Figure 5 summarizes our empirical findings. Our baseline model shows that patent invalidation
on average leads to a highly significant increase of about 30% in forward citations. Hence, our
results show that patent removal opens the path for follow-on inventions. This suggests patent rights
actually block cumulative innovation and that upstream and downstream inventors systematically
fail to reach necessary licensing agreements.
Our results indicate that bargaining failure also exists in environments that are typically associ-
ated with low transaction costs, but for which one can expect a large gain in freedom to operate from
invalidation, e.g., chemistry patents. Vice versa, we can relate the lack of a significant invalidation
effect in environments typically associated with high transaction costs (which are especially prone
to bargaining failure) to persistent restrictions in freedom to operate that result from the context of
the focal patent, e.g., closely related patents in fences or thickets.
The factors that impede successful licensing negotiations and the factors that limit the gain in
freedom to operate are unlikely to be perfectly independent of each other. For example, bargaining
failure due to high transaction costs should be particularly likely where many patents jointly block a
given technological trajectory and where size asymmetries disfavor market entrants. In such a case,
FTO is likely to be severely limited even after invalidation. The divergence between the general
blocking effect and the marginal blocking effect in the context of further barriers limiting FTO is
thus context-specific. The marginal blocking effect will approximate the overall effect of establishing
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Notes: Blue (gray) points depict the coefficients of invalidation resulting from IV regressions on subsamples as indicated.
All coefficients originate from regressions presented in Table 5 (full sample), Table 8 (discrete vs complex technologies;
small vs large patent holders) and Table 10 (patent thickets and patent fences). Error bars show the corresponding lower
and upper 95% confidence limits. The significance levels are indicated by stars next to each parameter estimate.
complete FTO only if the opposed patent is the sole determinant of FTO. In this case, the observed
effect should reflect the underlying bargaining failure. In contrast, where FTO remains restricted in
the absence of the patent right, the marginal blocking effect will merely constitute a lower bound
of the actual blocking effect.
In our study, the observed marginal effect of removing a given patent approximates the overall
effect of removing patent protection only in very specific subsamples (e.g., for small patent holders
without complementary assets, or in the absence of thickets and fences). For these cases, our find-
ings are in line with other studies that exploit large-scale variation in IP rights based on historic as
well as more recent case studies. Moser and Voena (2012) and Watzinger et al. (2017) each focus on
events where a set of patent rights became de facto ineffective in excluding others due to compulsory
licensing. Moser and Voena (2012) find an increase in US innovation after 130,000 German-owned
chemistry patents jointly became subject to compulsory licensing. Watzinger et al. (2017) study Bell
Labs patents and find that compulsory free licensing increased follow-on inventions. However, as
the authors state, these inventions occurred outside of the telecommunications industry, where Bell
did not control crucial complementary assets. Furthermore, the results of Williams (2013) suggest
that the release of a large set of previously IP protected genes led to an increase in subsequent sci-
entific research and product development. In their sample a single firm held a large set of exclusion
rights, which were practically all removed within a very short period of time. In fact, one reason
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why Sampat and Williams (2019) are not able to replicate the effect on gene follow-on invention
previously found by Williams (2013) may lie in their study’s focus on variation in gene protection
at the individual patent level.
Galasso and Schankerman (2015) obtain somewhat different results despite a similar identifica-
tion strategy. In their regression results, the invalidation of patents in discrete technologies by the
CAFC does not result in an increase of forward citations, while they do find such an effect for patents
in complex technologies. Moreover, they find that the strongest effect emerges when patents of large
firms are invalidated. We argue that the findings for their sample of litigation cases at the appellate
court for patent disputes cannot be extrapolated to the patent population in a simple fashion. First,
US litigation cases are typically the consequence of an infringement allegation, which in turn sug-
gests that the underlying technology has reached (or is close to) market maturity. Second, ending
up at the appellate court, these cases are both particularly valuable and particularly uncertain, to
the extent that the parties could not reach some form of settlement beforehand. These selection
mechanisms substantially determine the sample composition with respect to a variety of both ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics beyond the commercial value of the patent. After all, our
reasoning does not contradict their finding that patents negatively affect cumulative innovation in
environments with considerable transaction costs. However, our findings indicate that the block-
ing effect of patents extends beyond the regimes that can be identified in highly selective litigation
settings such as theirs. The patents selected for litigation at the highest court are simply no longer
representative for the population in their respective technology area.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the causal effect of patent invalidation on follow-on inventions. The
opposition procedure at the European Patent Office constitutes an ideal empirical setting. Opposition
allows a central, low-cost invalidation of patents, before they are converted into a bundle of national
patent rights in up to 38 signatory states. Opposition is hence a relatively frequent event with about
6% of all granted patents being attacked, which allows us to compile a sample of more than 33,000
opposed patents across all technology areas. Besides, the settlement rate is negligible, since private
settlement does not terminate the opposition proceeding.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways: it introduces a new instrument for identi-
fying the causal effects of patent invalidation, it outlines a coherent framework for the interpretation
of the empirical findings, it provides the first causal insights for the European institutional context,
and it enlarges the previously accessible empirical scope by more than an order of magnitude.
Our baseline model shows that patent invalidation leads – on average – to a highly significant
increase of about 30% in forward citations by other parties. Scholars have argued that patent-
induced bargaining failure exists to the extent that follow-on invention increases when patent rights
are removed. However, this empirical conclusion is contingent on an important premise: namely,
that freedom to operate is restored if the patent in question is removed. We address this issue by
distinguishing regimes where the blocking of follow-on invention is more or less dependent on the
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focal patent right.
Our empirical analysis produces two major results: First, follow-on innovation increases after
invalidation in discrete technology areas. This result may sound surprising to some readers. The
literature has conveyed the notion that in discrete technologies – where single patented inventions
allow innovators to protect one product – automatically amounts to low bargaining costs. While it
is probably true that for discrete technologies the subject matter of licensing agreements between
original and follow-on inventors is more clear-cut, this does not mean that bargaining failure can-
not occur. In fact, the reasons for bargaining failure in technology trade are manifold (see Arora
and Gambardella (2010) for an overview). For instance, licensing contracts are not necessarily
renegotiation-proof, which increases the uncertainty for both sides. The licensee may fear hold-up if
the licensor contests the licensing contract in court. Vice versa, the licensee may behave opportunis-
tically, lowering the licensor’s expected value from licensing. Furthermore, commercial uncertainty
makes ex ante licensing agreements incomplete. The most profitable application of an invention
(be it the original or the follow-on invention) may only emerge long after the contracts have been
signed. These difficulties are present across technology fields. Hence, we consider it unlikely that –
even with discrete technologies – an efficient licensing contract can always be found ex ante.
Second, in circumstances where freedom to operate remains restricted after invalidation, follow-
on invention does not increase significantly. This confirms our conjecture that both ex-ante bargain-
ing failure and a gain in freedom to operate are necessary preconditions for patent invalidation to
enhance cumulative innovation. We argue that our focus on FTO is important, and that its implica-
tions go considerably beyond the study of cumulative innovation. First, we note that this concept,
which has received little academic attention, acknowledges a simple fact: patents are not only verti-
cally related (as studied explicitly in the cumulative innovation literature), there are also horizontal
relationships that limit the effect of removing a single patent right. These stem from managerial
practice: “fencing an invention” by filing multiple patent applications is a commonly known, but
rarely analyzed patenting behavior. Patent thickets – as an intentional or unintentional consequence
of patent filing strategies – also limit the role of individual patents. For such contexts, the removal
of an individual patent will hardly result in an increase of FTO. These real-world phenomena have
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A Appendix: Figures
Figure A-1: Timeline for the average opposed patent in our sample
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Average
Time (yr)






Notes: The Pre3 citation window covers the first three years after filing, the Post5 citation window covers the five years
after the opposition outcome.
Figure A-2: Examiner participation
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Notes: The left graph depicts the effect of capacity constraints on examiner participation at technical unit level. Blue
points depict the coefficients from OLS regressions of the respective technical unit’s average examiner participation rate
on concurrent capacity constraints for different quarters relative to the opposition outcome. Each regression includes non-
parametric controls for technical unit and time, as in Table C-1, Column (3). Error bars show the corresponding lower
and upper 95% confidence limits. The right graph shows the densities of participation rates at examiner level (simple
and weighted). Examiners with fewer than 10 observations excluded.
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Figure A-3: Distribution of patent age and forward citations
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Notes: The left graph depicts the distribution of patent age at the time of opposition outcome. This graph includes all
opposition proceedings which are part of our main sample of analysis. The right graph depicts the distribution of EP/WO
examiner citations and US citations by other parties in the form of a quantile-quantile plot.
Figure A-4: Timing of the invalidation effect in technology subsamples
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Notes: These figures are in direct analogy to Figure 4 in the main text, but with the sample restricted to chemistry (Electr.
Engineering and Instruments) patents. Blue points depict the coefficients of invalidation resulting from IV regressions for
each year after opposition outcome, where as the dependent variable we use a dummy citation variable indicating whether
or not a patent has been cited in the respective time span. The usual independent citation control variables (Pre3Self and
Pre3Other) are also replaced by dummies. Error bars show the corresponding lower and upper 95% confidence limits.
The significance levels are indicated by stars below each bar.
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B Appendix: Descriptives
Table B-1: Prior empirical studies on patent rights and cumulative innovation
Study Dependent variable Identification Technology Sample
Patent grant
Murray and Stern (2007) Scientific citations DiD estimation Biotech 169 patents
Huang and Murray (2009) Scientific citations DiD estimation Biotech 1,279 patents
Sampat and Williams (2019) Scientific/patent citations IV (examiner fe) Biotech 1,545 patents
Patent invalidation
Galasso and Schankerman (2015) Patent citations IV (judge fe) All 1,357 patents
Compulsory licensing
Moser and Voena (2012) Patents DiD estimation Chemistry 130,000 patents
Watzinger et al. (2017) Patent citations DiD estimation IT 4,509 patents
Notes: DiD = difference-in-differences; fe = fixed effects (or similar).
Table B-2: Overview and definition of subsamples
Sample definition N %
All patents with filed opposition and grant date 1993-2011 49,938 100.00%
− destroyed files 8 0.02%
− unavailable files 150 0.30%
⇒ available in online file inspection register 49,780 99.68%
− no readable examiner information 1,203 2.41%
⇒ with examiner information 48,577 97.27%
− patent holder requests revocation 2,031 4.07%
− patent holder withdraws patent 514 1.03%
− opponent withdraws opposition 3,863 7.74%
− no readable opposition information 338 0.68%
− opposition proceeding still pending 470 0.94%
⇒ with opposition division information 41,358 82.82%
− first decision after 2011 8,283 16.59%
⇒ sample of analysis 33,075 66.23%
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Table B-3: Opposition outcomes and appeals
Oppositions Appeal rate Reversal rate
Electrical engineering
Outcome: valid 982 0.39 0.18
Outcome: invalid 2,458 0.45 0.02
Instruments
Outcome: valid 1,136 0.46 0.23
Outcome: invalid 3,086 0.50 0.03
Chemistry
Outcome: valid 3,277 0.43 0.22
Outcome: invalid 9,734 0.50 0.02
Mechanical engineering
Outcome: valid 3,496 0.43 0.21
Outcome: invalid 6,890 0.45 0.02
Other Fields
Outcome: valid 743 0.48 0.17
Outcome: invalid 1,273 0.46 0.02
Notes: Reversal rate unconditional on appeal.
Table B-4: Groups of control variables
Group name Variables in group
Year effects Dummies for grant year
Dummies for opposition outcome year
Age effects Dummies for age in years
Technology effects Dummies for technology class (34)
Patent characteristics Dummy for PCT application
Dummy for accelerated examination
Dummy for examination in Munich
Dummies for publication language
Size of docdb family
Number of IPC classes
Number of inventors
log(1 + Number of patent literature references)
Patent holder characteristics Number of applicants
Dummies for patent holder country
Dummy for patent holder corporation
Dummies for patent holder patent portfolio size:
tertiles within technology: small – medium – large
Opponent characteristics Number of opponents
Dummies for opponent country
Dummy for opponent corporation
Examination characteristics Duration of examination
Duration of wait until examination
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C Appendix: Instrumental Variable and Complier Analysis
Table C-1: Regressions of instrumental dummy variable “Examiner participation in opposition pro-
ceeding” on technical unit capacity constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Exam. part. rate Exam. part. rate Exam. part. rate Exam. part. rate
Capacity constraint −0.098 0.526∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.462∗
(0.066) (0.110) (0.133) (0.224)
– 4 quarter lag −0.101
(0.177)
– 3 quarter lag −0.079
(0.217)
– 2 quarter lag 0.159
(0.229)
– 1 quarter lag −0.023
(0.217)
– 1 quarter lead −0.057
(0.247)
– 2 quarter lead 0.298
(0.257)
– 3 quarter lead −0.076
(0.251)
– 4 quarter lead −0.095
(0.257)
– 5 quarter lead 0.043
(0.205)
Tech unit effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Time effects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Model degrees of freedom 1 32 74 83
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.186 0.289 0.287
Observations 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245
Notes: This table explores the relationship between concurrent capacity constraints and examiner participation at the
technical unit level. The level of observation is the technical unit (32 in total) over time (calendar year quarters). Capacity
constraints are captured by the share of patent applications whose search report was not completed before the first
publication 18 months after priority filing (see Haeussler et al. (2014) for details). We link the measure of capacity
constraints to the quarter one year prior to the oral proceeding and opposition decision – the time when the technical
unit’s director typically allocates the opposition file to the opposition division (see p. 26 of the EPO’s Quality Report 2016).
Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of the concurrent capacity constraints on the examiner participation rate. Column
(4) shows the effect of the capacity constraints variable with a set of lags/leads. Robust standard errors presented in
parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table C-2: Probit regressions of instrumental dummy variable “Examiner participation in opposition
proceeding” on patent and examination characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Exam. part. Exam. part. Exam. part. Exam. part.
log(No of claims) −0.031∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) −0.008† −0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
PCT application (d) −0.045∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Accelerated examination (d) −0.012 0.023∗∗ 0.021∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Examined in Munich (d) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Publication language: German (d) 0.013 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Publication language: English (d) 0.033∗∗ 0.014 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Docdb family size −0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of IPC classifications 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No of inventors 0.002 0.003† 0.003†
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(Patent backward references) 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Duration of examination (yr) −0.015∗∗∗ 0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Duration of wait (yr) −0.014∗∗∗ 0.008 0.007
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Year effects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects No No Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics No No No Yes∗
Opponent characteristics No No No Yes
Model degrees of freedom 3 14 96 110
χ2-statistic 73.7 572.9 2,751.0 2,772.1
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.014 0.072 0.073
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: This table shows probit regressions of the “Examiner participation” dummy on the other exogenous variables not
shown in Table 4. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no citations. A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table C-3: Differences between patents by opposition outcome
Dependent variable β(Invalidated) StdErr t p
Docdb family size 0.679∗∗∗ 0.108 6.278 0.000
PCT application (d) 0.033∗∗∗ 0.006 5.723 0.000
No of applicants −0.003 0.004 −0.722 0.470
No of inventors 0.098∗∗∗ 0.020 4.835 0.000
No of claims 1.265∗∗∗ 0.109 11.578 0.000
No of IPC classes 0.006 0.027 0.217 0.828
No of PL refs 0.194∗∗∗ 0.035 5.514 0.000
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.007 5.414 0.000
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.012∗ 0.005 2.463 0.014
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of different patent characteristics on first opposition outcome and sets of indicator
variables for technology area, grant year and opposition outcome year. Each row shows the coefficient, the robust standard
error, the t-statistic, and the p-value of the indicator for invalidation. The two groups of patents differ significantly,
indicating the necessity of the instrumental variable approach. One is added to all citation variables before taking the
logarithm to include patents with no citations. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table C-4: Differences between patents by examiner participation
Dependent variable β(Ex. part.) StdErr t p
Docdb family size −0.092 0.128 −0.718 0.473
PCT application (d) 0.003 0.006 0.464 0.643
No of applicants 0.004 0.004 1.109 0.268
No of inventors 0.035† 0.021 1.654 0.098
No of claims −0.002 0.124 −0.014 0.989
No of IPC classes 0.012 0.029 0.415 0.678
No of PL refs 0.003 0.037 0.083 0.934
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.002 0.007 0.313 0.754
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.004 0.005 0.837 0.403
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of different patent characteristics on the instrumental participation variable and sets
of indicator variables for technology area, grant year and opposition outcome year. Each row shows the coefficient, the
robust standard error, the t-statistic, and the p-value of the “Examiner participation” indicator. Patents with and without
participation of the granting examiner in opposition do not differ significantly. One is added to all citation variables
before taking the logarithm to include patents with no citations. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001.
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Table C-5: LATE discussion – Complier shares
Binary instrument
Exam. part. pˆ(Inv)< q(.25) pˆ(Inv)< q(.5) pˆ(Inv)< q(.75)
P(Invalidated) 0.7087 0.7087 0.7087 0.7087
P(Instrument = 1) 0.6770 0.2500 0.5000 0.7500
P(Complier) 0.0661 0.2110 0.1987 0.2046
P(Complier | Invalidated) 0.0301 0.2233 0.1402 0.0722
P(Complier | Not Inv.) 0.1535 0.1811 0.3411 0.5267
Notes: This table shows the share of complier patents in the full sample, P(Complier), the share among invalidated
patents, P(Complier | Invalidated), and the share among non-invalidated patents, P(Complier | Not Inv.), with respect to
different binary instruments. The first column uses the examiner participation indicator variable, the remaining columns
transform the probit-predicted invalidation probability instrument pˆ of Eq. (5.2) into binary instruments by splitting at the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. For the examiner participation instrument, the population share of compliers
lies at around 6.6%, which is comprised of a share of 3.0% for invalidated patents and 15.4% for non-invalidated patents.
Following the notation of Angrist and Pischke (2009, Section 4.4.4), we can write a patent i’s potential treatment status as
D1i when the instrument is Z = 1 and as D0i when Z = 0. “Complier” patents are then defined as those whose treatment
status is sensitive to the instrument, i.e., D1i = 0 (no invalidation) and D0i = 1 (invalidation) in the above context. In
a potential outcomes framework, the Wald estimand can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE) on
the subpopulation of compliers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). They have to be distinguished from “always-takers” with
D1i = D0i = 1, and “never-takers” with D1i = D0i = 0. The calculations of this table rely, inter alia, on the monotonicity
assumption D0i ≥ D1i∀i, i.e., on excluding the existence of “defiers” with D1i = 1 and D0i = 0.
Table C-6: LATE discussion – Complier characteristics
Binary characteristic x E[x] E[x|complier] E[x|complier] / E[x] p(Ratio = 1)
DOCDB family size > 8 0.480 0.496 1.033 (0.080) 0.678
PCT application (d) 0.436 0.425 0.975 (0.086) 0.770
No of applicants > 1 0.061 0.032 0.521 (0.315) 0.129
No of inventors > 2 0.421 0.369 0.878 (0.092) 0.182
No of claims > 11 0.460 0.470 1.021 (0.083) 0.796
No of IPCs > 2 0.393 0.335 0.854 (0.100) 0.142
No of PL lit refs > 4 0.497 0.480 0.966 (0.080) 0.667
CitEPExaPre3Other > 0 0.407 0.387 0.952 (0.093) 0.606
CitEPExaPre3Self > 0 0.230 0.175 0.761 (0.142) 0.092
Notes: This table explores in how far the complier subpopulation differs from the full sample of opposed patents with
respect to a series of patent characteristics. Since the underlying calculation relies on characteristics being binary, count
variables are split at their indicated median. The first column indicates the share E[x] = P(x = 1) of patents with x = 1
in the entire population, the second column indicates the corresponding share E[x | complier] among complier patents.
The third column shows the relative likelihood that complier patents have the binary characteristic x indicated on the
left. The corresponding robust standard errors shown in parentheses are derived using seemingly unrelated estimation.
Most characteristics occur among complier patents with similar rates as in the full sample. Exceptions are the share of
patents with more than one applicant and the share of patents with self citations (added by EP examiners), both of which
are lower among complier patents. However, none of the ratios is significantly different from one on a 5% level, as shown
in column four. Compliers are defined as in the notes of Table C-5.
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D Appendix: Robustness
Table D-1: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – by sizes of focal and citing patent holders –
chemistry subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExa. . . Post5Other) Large Small Large Small
Patent holder subsample Large Large Small Small
Invalidated (d) 0.130 −0.043 0.159∗ 0.236∗
(0.128) (0.154) (0.066) (0.102)
log(No of claims) 0.025∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.013† 0.031∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.033∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019 −0.011 0.027∗ −0.005
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes Yes∗ Yes†
Underidentification test 23.1 23.1 113.1 113.1
Weak identification test 63.0 63.0 197.8 197.8
Observations 4,328 4,328 8,670 8,670
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the chemistry subsample with
respect to the differences in size between the holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and the holder of the
focal patent (subsample). Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of invalidation on citations to patents held by large and
small (non-large) patent owners, respectively, for the subsample of patents held by large patent owners, columns (3) and
(4) analogously for the subsample of patents held by small patent owners. One is added to all citation variables before
taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is
instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy
and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al.,
2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the
Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001.
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Table D-2: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences – chemistry
subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.149 0.245∗ 0.282 0.326∗∗
(0.189) (0.104) (0.201) (0.110)
log(No of claims) 0.052∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.017 0.048∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) −0.003 −0.001 0.004 0.017
(0.027) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes† Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification test 44.8 77.2 33.4 109.1
Weak identification test 53.5 221.8 56.7 216.4
Observations 1,613 10,786 3,629 9,364
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the chemistry subsample in
the presence or absence of patent thickets and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent a sample split with respect to
the presence of a patent thicket in the focal patent’s technology area. We consider a thicket to be present if the area triples
variable derived by Von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th percentile in the full sample. Columns (3) and
(4) show the effect of invalidation for a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent fence erected by the holder of
the focal patent. We consider a fence to be present if we find at least one similar patent by the focal patent owner prior to
opposition. The similarity measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims, the technology area and the full text of the
patent. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In
each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak
identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively,
as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained
in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.
Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-3: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – by sizes of focal and citing patent holders –
electrical engineering / instruments subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExa. . . Post5Other) Large Small Large Small
Patent holder subsample Large Large Small Small
Invalidated (d) 0.016 −0.026 0.080 0.309∗
(0.166) (0.253) (0.107) (0.150)
log(No of claims) 0.004 0.024 0.026∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.039† 0.003 0.015 0.072∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024)
Year effects Yes† Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes Yes∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes
Underidentification test 42.8 42.8 46.9 46.9
Weak identification test 53.1 53.1 96.2 96.2
Observations 2,547 2,547 5,105 5,105
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the electrical engineering / instru-
ments subsample with respect to the differences in size between the holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and
the holder of the focal patent (subsample). Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of invalidation on citations to patents
held by large and small (non-large) patent owners, respectively, for the subsample of patents held by large patent owners,
columns (3) and (4) analogously for the subsample of patents held by small patent owners. One is added to all citation
variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Inval-
idated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner
participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the
heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s
ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can
be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-4: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences – electrical
engineering / instruments subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.187 0.319 0.092 0.400†
(0.205) (0.231) (0.188) (0.219)
log(No of claims) 0.076∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.171∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.107† 0.027 0.022 0.089∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 32.0 63.7 41.8 39.8
Weak identification test 46.7 91.1 44.9 90.4
Observations 1,097 6,200 1,844 5,798
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the electrical engineering
/ instruments subsample in the presence or absence of patent thickets and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent
a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent thicket in the focal patent’s technology area. We consider a thicket
to be present if the area triples variable derived by Von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th percentile in
the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of invalidation for a sample split with respect to the presence of a
patent fence erected by the holder of the focal patent. We consider a fence to be present if we find at least one similar
patent by the focal patent owner prior to opposition. The similarity measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims,
the technology area and the full text of the patent. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with
the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other
exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-5: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – exclusion of particular cases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample No dead patents No acc exam No rev appeals No appeals
Invalidated (d) 0.270∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.171†
(0.072) (0.087) (0.070) (0.091)
log(No of claims) 0.054∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.020∗ 0.019∗ 0.017∗ 0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes
Underidentification test 217.8 151.1 289.6 43.0
Weak identification test 564.8 407.0 731.5 251.4
Observations 30,347 29,389 30,620 17,653
Notes: One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In
each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak
identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively,
as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained
in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.
Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-6: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPextExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.005 0.249∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.067) (0.026) (0.069)
log(No of claims) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
log(CitEPextExaPre3Other) 0.135∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.003 0.131∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
log(CitEPextExaPre3Self) 0.015 0.017† 0.032∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 222.3 222.3 222.3
Weak identification test 505.5 505.5 505.5
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 5, but counts only one forward citation per unique follow-on applicant in the
respective time frames. The results thus indicate the effect of invalidation on the extensive margin of follow-on invention.
Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation
on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured by EP/WO
examiner forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision of the opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4)
show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held by other parties than the
focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner herself and on the total number
of follow-on patents, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents
with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding
probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables.
The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM
and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of
the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors
presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-7: Baseline regressions with bootstrapped standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.008 0.292∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.079) (0.033) (0.081)
log(No of claims) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.005† 0.127∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: Analogous to Table 5 in the main text, but showing bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 iterations).
One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS
regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on
the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification
tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated
groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. All bootstrapped standard errors are quantitatively very similar to the
robust standard errors in Table 5, resulting in identical significance levels for the invalidation coefficient. Significance
levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-8: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citation dummy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: (CitEPExaPost5. . . ) > 0 (d) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.001 0.247∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.060) (0.038) (0.061)
log(No of claims) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
CitEPExaPre3Other > 0 (d) 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
CitEPExaPre3Self > 0 (d) 0.016∗ 0.017∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes† Yes† Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 221.1 221.1 221.1
Weak identification test 504.7 504.7 504.7
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 5, but has all citation variables replaced with the corresponding dummies indi-
cating at least one citation. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding
probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables.
The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM
and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of
the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors
presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
54
Table D-9: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – alternative treatment of “amended” patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.020∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.042 0.234∗∗
(0.006) (0.072) (0.031) (0.075)
log(No of claims) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 97.4 97.4 97.4
Weak identification test 426.8 426.8 426.8
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 5, but has cases where the patent remained valid in amended form with fewer
claims lost than the global median treated as valid. Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and
the 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held by other parties than
the focal patent owner, as measured by EP/WO examiner forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision
of the opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4) show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number
of follow-on patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by
the focal patent owner himself and on the total number of follow-on patents, respectively. In each 2SLS regression the
“Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner
participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the
heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s
ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can
be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-10: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology and size – alternative treatment
of “amended” patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Complex Discrete Large Small
Invalidated (d) 0.070 0.247∗∗ 0.080 0.302∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.077) (0.127) (0.087)
log(No of claims) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.031∗ 0.016† 0.020† 0.031∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗ Yes† Yes∗ Yes
Underidentification test 21.4 85.4 28.2 76.9
Weak identification test 75.9 386.0 96.9 345.8
Observations 14,946 18,129 11,038 22,037
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 8, but has cases where the patent remained valid in amended form with fewer
claims lost than the global median treated as valid. Columns (1) and (2) compare the effect in complex technologies
to that in discrete technologies, columns (3) and (4) compare the effect for patents held by large patent holders to that
for patents held by small (non-large) patent holders. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with
the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other
exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table D-11: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – citations added by non-focal examiners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPOtExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Technology area Electr Eng Instruments Chemistry Mech Eng
Invalidated (d) 0.273 0.428† 0.292 0.211
(0.283) (0.256) (0.184) (0.170)
log(No of claims) 0.003 0.077∗∗ 0.019 0.037∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
log(CitEPOtExaPre3Other) 0.141∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.025 0.126∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.059) (0.023) (0.027)
log(CitEPOtExaPre3Self) −0.034 0.035 −0.023 0.065†
(0.068) (0.066) (0.026) (0.035)
Year effects Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes Yes† Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification test 10.6 19.3 28.7 9.7
Weak identification test 12.5 18.9 41.5 23.5
Observations 576 725 2,596 2,674
Notes: While in close analogy to Table 7, the EP examiner citation variables (both dependent and independent) in the
IV regressions above include only those citations, for which we can exclude that they were made by the focal patent’s
examiner. Due to resulting data restrictions we have to limit the sample to patents with an application filing year ≥ 2001.
While this reduces the number of observations and the citation count, the coefficients closely reproduce those of Table 7,
ruling out potentially modified powers of recall when a focal examiner involved in the opposition proceeding is compiling
subsequent search reports as a main driver of the observed effect. One is added to all citation variables before taking the
logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented
with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other
exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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E Appendix: US Citations
Note: The numbering of the tables is analogous to the one for EP/WO citations in the main text.
Table US-3: Characteristics of US forward citations by relationship to cited patent
Self citations Other citations
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Publication authority
US (d) 1 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 1 1
Citation characteristics
Citation lag (yr) 10.59 3.38 0 28 10.90 3.83 0 30
Docdb family size 7.28 6.60 1 134 5.77 6.22 1 254
Sector (citing applicant)
Company (d) 0.99 0.11 0 1 0.86 0.35 0 1
Country (citing applicant)
EPC (excl. GB) (d) 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
GB (d) 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1
US (d) 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.62 0.49 0 1
JP (d) 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Other (d) 0.02 0.12 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Size (citing applicant)
Large (d) 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.27 0.45 0 1
Medium (d) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Small (d) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
Observations 18,315 137,592
Notes: This table includes all forward citations of US applications to patents subject to opposition proceedings in our
main sample of analysis. The unit of observation is the citation. In case of multiple citing applicants, we give preference
according to the ordering of sector, country, and size. “Country” refers to the country of residence. Size categories are
proxied by the number of patents (incl. applications) filed during the last five years prior to the opposition decision (large:
200 and more patents, medium: 20 and more patents, small: fewer than 20 patents.
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Table US-4: Examiner participation and opposition outcome (US citations)
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Invalidated (d) Invalidated (d) Examiner participation (d)
Exam. participation (d) −0.066∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)






Duration of examination (yr) −0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.007)
Duration of wait (yr) 0.009 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Year effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects No Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes†
Patent holder characteristics No Yes∗∗ Yes∗
Opponent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Model degrees of freedom 1 111 110
χ2-statistic 154.3 1,822.5 2,772.1
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.061 0.073
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: The probit regressions in columns (1) and (2) illuminate the relevance of the “Examiner participation” dummy
for the outcome of the opposition proceeding. The invalidation predictions of the probit regression in column (2)—or
equivalent predictions for subsamples and other citation measures—are used as the instrument in the 2SLS instrumental
variables regressions throughout the paper. Column (3) shows the probit regression of the “Examiner participation”
dummy on the other exogenous variables. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include
patents with no citations. A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in
Table B-4 in the Appendix.
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Table US-5: Impact of invalidation on US citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.027∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.118) (0.062) (0.121)
log(No of claims) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.438∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.155∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes† Yes† Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes Yes†
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 222.9 222.9 222.9
Weak identification test 505.8 505.8 505.8
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation
on US forward citations to patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured by US forward citations
in a 5-year window following the decision of the opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4) show 2SLS regressions for
the impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, on
the number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner himself and on the total number of follow-on patents,
respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations.
In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak
identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively,
as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained
in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.
Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table US-6: Impact of invalidation on US citations – patent age and value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Younger Older Smaller family Larger family
Invalidated (d) 0.448∗ 0.265 0.137 0.256
(0.182) (0.172) (0.149) (0.170)
log(No of claims) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.454∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.167∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes† Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes∗
Underidentification test 93.7 129.7 38.3 155.3
Weak identification test 182.5 257.7 206.7 249.4
Observations 16,981 16,094 17,188 15,880
Notes: This table explores the differences of the invalidation effect on US forward citations with respect to the age of the
focal patent at the time of the opposition division’s decision and with respect to the size of its DOCDB family, a common
patent value indicator. In columns (1) and (2) we split the sample at the age median (8 years), where “Younger” refers
to patents of age ≤ 8 years and “Older” refers to patents of age > 8 years. In columns (3) and (4) the sample is split
at the median DOCDB family size (8 members), “Smaller family” referring to patents with a family size ≤ 8, “Larger
family” referring to patents with a family size > 8. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with
the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other
exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table US-7: Impact of invalidation on US citations – technology main areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Technology area Electr Eng Instruments Chemistry Mech Eng
Invalidated (d) −0.040 0.582 0.307† 0.047
(0.297) (0.398) (0.171) (0.209)
log(No of claims) 0.136∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.184∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.028) (0.014) (0.019)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes
Underidentification test 32.2 49.3 123.2 43.9
Weak identification test 75.1 63.1 257.5 77.3
Observations 3,432 4,220 13,011 10,384
Notes: Columns (1)–(4) show the impact of invalidation on US forward citations to patents held by parties other than
the focal patent holder for the technology main area subsamples Electrical Engineering, Instruments, Chemistry and
Mechanical Engineering, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents
with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding
probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables.
The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM
and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of
the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors
presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table US-8: Impact of invalidation on US citations – technology and size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Complex Discrete Large Small
Invalidated (d) 0.308 0.389∗ 0.202 0.484∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.152) (0.215) (0.139)
log(No of claims) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.510∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Underidentification test 78.2 136.4 64.4 172.2
Weak identification test 191.2 314.7 149.2 351.3
Observations 14,946 18,129 11,038 22,037
Notes: This table shows the impact of invalidation on US forward citations to patents held by parties other than the
focal patent holder for different sample splits. Columns (1) and (2) compare the effect in complex technologies to that
in discrete technologies, columns (3) and (4) compare the effect for patents held by large patent holders to that for
patents held by small (non-large) patent holders. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with
the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other
exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table US-9: Impact of invalidation on US citations – by sizes of focal and citing patent holders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUS. . . Post5Other) Large Small Large Small
Patent holder subsample Large Large Small Small
Invalidated (d) 0.175 0.088 0.269∗∗ 0.324∗
(0.169) (0.204) (0.093) (0.132)
log(No of claims) 0.035∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.217∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes†
Underidentification test 64.4 64.4 172.2 172.2
Weak identification test 149.2 149.2 351.3 351.3
Observations 11,038 11,038 22,037 22,037
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on US citations with respect to the differences in size between the
holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and the holder of the focal patent (subsample). Columns (1) and (2) show
the effect of invalidation on citations to patents held by large and small (non-large) patent owners, respectively, for the
subsample of patents held by large patent owners, columns (3) and (4) analogously for the subsample of patents held by
small patent owners. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward
citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted
by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification
and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics,
respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables
contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in
parentheses. Significance levels: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table US-10: Impact of invalidation on US citations – patent thickets and patent fences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.326 0.227† 0.332 0.443∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.130) (0.220) (0.134)
log(No of claims) 0.126∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.429∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.131∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes† Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes† Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 64.3 178.6 68.9 171.8
Weak identification test 81.7 424.0 118.7 390.0
Observations 3,239 28,494 8,826 24,233
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on US citations in the presence or absence of patent thickets
and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent thicket in the
focal patent’s technology area. We consider a thicket to be present if the area triples variable derived by Von Graevenitz
et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th percentile in the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of invalidation
for a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent fence erected by the holder of the focal patent. We consider
a fence to be present if we find at least one similar patent by the focal patent owner prior to opposition. The similarity
measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims, the technology area and the full text of the patent. One is added to
all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression
the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the
“Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification
tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated
groups can be found in Table B-4 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Significance levels:
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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F Technical Appendix:
Construction of the Examiner Participation Indicator Variable
As explained in section 5, we use the presence or absence of the primary examiner on the oppo-
sition board as an instrument to allow for causal inference concerning follow-on invention for the
sample of all opposed EP patents between 1993 and 2011. For this purpose, we first identify the
relevant set of patents by the EPO PATSTAT Register – 2015 Autumn Edition. Second, to deter-
mine the names of the examination and opposition division’s members, we download three types
of (scanned) pdf-documents from the EPO database for each of the identified patents: the grant
decision for the examination division and the minutes of the oral proceedings as well as the oppo-
sition outcome decision for the opposition division. We use two types of documents for the latter
to reduce the likelihood of errors. Third, we extract and pre-process the image files included in the
pdf-files and read the contained information to txt-files using optical character recognition (OCR)
software. Fourth, using a keyword search specific to each document type and language, we identify
and parse the names of the respective division’s members to a standardized format with first and
last names separated. Fifth, we check whether one person is a member of both the examination
and the opposition division by comparing the names of both divisions with different string similarity
measures.
Two aspects are worth noting. First, the use of both the minutes of the oral proceedings and
the opposition decision document to identify the opposition division is legitimate, since the division
holding the oral proceedings must be the same as the opposition division rendering the decision in
writing, otherwise the decision is deemed to be void.33 Second, in some cases we are unable to
identify all relevant members, for example because the EPO database holds the wrong document
under the specific link, and in some cases we might erroneously identify the substantive examiner
as being present or absent, for example because the scanned document and thus the OCR is of poor
quality. However, the read-out quality and success do not depend on the outcome of the opposition,
since the corresponding decision document has the same format across all three outcomes, and thus
does not affect identification.
33See for instance T 390/86 with a decision from 17 November 1987.
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